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You’ve heard it all before, perhaps: the epic story of an
uncooperative lab director with communication problems; a
disenfranchised and disillusioned whistleblower with a mission,
a world-renowned but obstinate scientist; a powerful
congressman with a mandate to ensure that the taxpayer’s
money is used responsibly; a duo of unofficial but intellectually
well-armed and ethically uncompromising investigators;
confused university officials torn between concerns about
fairness on one hand and possible damage to their institution’s
reputation on the other; government officials more preoccupied
with in-fighting and advancing their own careers than with their
investigative duties; aggressive and unscrupulous Washington
lawyers; friends, enemies, colleagues, emotions, loyalties, moral
obligations and self-interest. In short, this was a very human
story about people who were expected to behave in a
superhuman way under exceptional circumstances. All were
convinced that their motives were honorable; all were under
pressure to protect their own reputations in the eyes of different
peer communities and constituencies; and all made serious
mistakes. 
Of the thousands of lines that have been written about the
Baltimore affair (also known as the Imanishi-Kari affair), two
books that attempt to trace the full story and place the events
into perspective are worth reading for those who require a
more cool-headed view than what was provided from
contemporaneous journal, newspaper and television coverage
of the controversy. One book has been reviewed in prominent
journals [7, 10, 11]; the other has received much less attention. 
The origin, development and outcome of the Baltimore case
are documented in detail in both books, which are written for
the educated general public. Daniel J. Kevles, a historian of
science at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), has
produced a book (Fig. 1) that has been cited as the definitive
study, and as conclusive evidence of the dangers of government
interference in the ethical oversight of the research process [3].
His seventeen-chapter study is accompanied by a glossary of
technical terms and of source abbreviations, copious endnotes,
and an assay on sources. He goes into great detail on the errors
made by the Office of Science Integrity (OSI) (now the Office
of Research Integrity, ORI) and the Secret Service in their
analyses of the evidence against Imanishi-Kari, and attacks
John Dingell and his staff for being overly concerned—for their
own political motives—with teaching arrogant scientists that
they are obliged to use public money with utmost responsibility.
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Fig. 1 Cover of the book The Baltimore Case. A Trial of Politics, Science, and
Character. Daniel J. Kevles. New York: W.W. Norton, 1998. 509 pp. ISBN  0-
393-04103-4
However, he also shows that the initial investigations carried
out at the coauthors’ and whistleblower’s universities were
marred by disinterest, lack of experience, and institutional
rivalry between competing centers. 
Kevles’s book is filled with references that reflect his careful
historiographic methods of investigation. However, many
references are to his own notes on telephone conversations held
with the persons involved in the case. This raises the possibility
that some unconscious recall bias may have influenced both
their account of past events and his reporting of these interviews.
Moreover, as he admits in the Preface (p. 12), he “eventually
became persuaded that Imanishi-Kari was innocent of the
charges against her”, his conviction being reinforced by her
much-delayed official exculpation, and by Baltimore’s re-entry
into public life as President of Caltech—where the author
has been a member of the faculty for more than thirty years.
So it appears the author had a mission in writing this book.
That mission was not to discover the truth about the original
publication in Cell [12] that caused the controversy, but to
rehabilitate Baltimore and present him as a martyr to politically-
motivated, incompetent government meddling in the subtleties
of scientific research. The writing is consistently slanted in
favor of Baltimore, and against whistleblower O’Toole,
congressman Dingell, unofficial fraudbusters Stewart and Feder,
and indeed all other players perceived by the author to be
determined to bring his hero down. 
Kevles thus combines his skills as a historian with a well-
stocked arsenal of rhetorical devices to lead the reader to the
conclusion that Baltimore was treated unfairly by his
professional adversaries, the lay press, and the US government.
And he succeeded in convincing at least one book reviewer and
journal editor that his view of the story is the only one worth
believing [10]: Steele’s book review in Nature Medicine reflects
the triumphant tone with which the scientific community
celebrated Imanishi-Kari’s official exculpation as proof that
the government has no business trying to regulate research. 
Judy Sarasohn, a Washington journalist, states in the
Acknowledgments (p. ix) of her book (Fig. 2) that she set out
to write “a story of human frailties and strengths for a broad
audience”, rather than to try attempt to judge who was right
and who was wrong. She explains that all scientists who were
aware of the Baltimore case were polarized, and that she found
it difficult to find a neutral immunologist willing to explain the
scientific basis of the disputed Cell paper to her. As she notes,
“Many scientists had not bothered to, or did not want to, look
at the actual paper and allegations in dispute, and their feelings
about the controversy were so raw that they did not believe
other scientists could be objective.” This is a key point: the
controversy became so heated that legitimate questions about
the data in the paper were almost forgotten in the battle to save
Baltimore’s reputation, and to keep the government out of
the laboratories. But much of her information is also based on
personal interviews with the players, so again, readers need to
be cautious. However, both authors recount the same events as
reported by many of the same sources, and I found no
discrepancies in their accounts of historical fact. Perhaps the
main difference in comparison with Kevles is that Sarasohn
points out how Baltimore’s position regarding the flawed data
in the paper, Imanishi-Kari’s role in producing them, and
O’Toole’s motives in denouncing them, changed radically as
the investigation proceeded. Sarasohn divides her analysis into
nineteen chapters, followed by detailed notes on sources.
Fortunately each book concludes with a well-constructed index
that makes it easy to locate specific information. 
Both books do an excellent job of presenting the
immunological findings initially reported (then retracted, then
unretracted) in the original Cell article, and of providing possible
interpretations of their significance. Regardless of whether
readers prefer the dense documentary tone used by Kevles or
Sarasohn’s true-to-life scientific drama style, all will appreciate
both authors’ careful dissection of the facts about the original
data. Both books do a very good job of explaining the technical
problems with the data in the original paper. Neither author
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Fig. 2 Cover of the book Science on Trial. The Whistle-blower, the Accused,
and the Nobel Laureate. Judy Sarasohn. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.
294 pp. ISBN 0-312-09247-4
disguises the fact that the dispute between coauthors and the
whistleblower went beyond mere differences in interpretation,
and eventually turned on serious—and entirely justified—
doubts as to the accuracy of some of the data. In fact, the appeals
panel of the US Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), in its final decision, noted that “The Cell paper as a
whole is rife with errors of all sorts... [including] some which,
despite all these years and layers of review, have never been
previously pointed out or corrected” [5]. One can’t help but
wonder why these errors were not detected by the journal’s
peer reviewers. 
Although both books recount the same events, Sarasohn’s
brings readers closer to appreciating how scientists,
administrators and policy makers became caught up in an
unprecedentedly intense storm of controversy, and how their
conflicting motivations allowed questions raised about the
accuracy of findings reported in prestigious journal to escalate
into a national crisis of trust in publicly-funded research.
Sarasohn seeks to trace the emotions behind the players’ actions,
whereas Kevles analyzes the case from a more political and
legalistic viewpoint. (Photographs of Imanishi-Kari’s lawyers
are among the many faces that illustrate his report.) In either
case, the moral of this long and troublesome story for
researchers is “Keep accurate lab notebooks, and discuss the
data with all co-authors and colleagues whose unpublished
observations are cited, before submitting the manuscript.” If
Imanishi-Kari had followed the first piece of advice, and if
Baltimore had been more conscientious in following the second,
the whole affair would very probably not have happened. 
The many errors made in the Baltimore case investigation,
and the painfully long period (about ten years) that had to elapse
before the final ruling was announced, were the result not so
much of intentionally destructive government intrusion as of
the lack of experience at all levels of administration and
oversight in dealing with accusations of improper behavior.
When O’Toole first expressed her misgivings about the data,
neither universities nor the US government had at that time
clear procedures in place to follow up on allegations of
misconduct. In the end, the need to guarantee due process to
the accused took precedence over the evidence—much of it
eventually disallowed on technical or circumstantial grounds—
that Imanishi-Kari and her co-authors published data that were
of doubtful validity, initially refused to acknowledge that there
were problems with the data, and intentionally provided
inaccurate information to the OSI. (The actual course of events
was much more complex, so don’t take my word for it—read
the books yourself!) This outcome was entirely laudable and
necessary in a system in which due process must take
precedence over any other consideration, and Kevles reiterated
this point in his response to Turney’s book review in Science
[6]. It nonetheless failed to get to the heart of the problem that
triggered the controversy in the first place: Should those data
have been published? How did a paper with misinterpretation
of the data, serious errors, and internal inconsistencies get into
print in a prestigious journal? An appeal to the DHHS eventually
exculpated her of all counts of misconduct, but after reading
the books, one wonders what the outcome would be now that
more formal mechanisms exist to investigate allegations of
misconduct and academic abuse of power. On the basis of the
information Kevles and Sarasohn have given us, it is wrong to
conclude that the allegations O’Toole brought against her
superiors were “spurious,” as remarked in a Commentary
published in July 1999 in The Lancet [3]. 
This and other highly publicized misconduct investigations
had consequences for journal publication policies. Many
journals implemented stricter criteria for authorship, and began
to require that all co-authors and colleagues whose unpublished
work is cited give assurance in writing that they have read
the entire manuscript and agree to its submittal. In addition,
journals began to require that the original data be kept on file
to be made available to the editors or reviewers on request, if
doubts should arise as to their authenticity. Another change in
submission policy that seems to have stemmed from these cases
is the requirement that authors give assurance that figures,
especially those that have been subjected to photographic or
digitalization processes, have not been manipulated to enhance
or delete certain features. 
However, despite these prophylactic measures aimed at
preventing fraudulent information from entering the peer review
system, journal editors have almost unanimously refused all
responsibility for detecting or investigating suspected fraud.
The argument is that submission of manuscripts and peer review
are undertaken in good faith, on the assumption that the contents
of every manuscript reflect honest findings of legitimate
scientific inquiry. Therefore, if the research looks plausible,
reviewers and editors have no motive to suspect misconduct,
and are therefore not primed to detect it. Such a policy
constitutes a tacit admission that journals are sometimes
hoodwinked into publishing unreproducible observations. This,
in fact, is apparently what happened with the Cell paper—
inconsistencies and contradictions in the data went unnoticed
(or were overlooked) because the overall picture of the findings
and conclusions seemed reasonable. 
Some editors will alert the author’s immediate institutional
superior if questions are raised about the reported work in
the course of peer review, and suggest that the matter be
investigated through the appropriate channels at the authors’
home institution—often ignoring the fact that no such channels
exist yet in most universities and research centers in countries
where English is not the first language. (The only exceptions
to date are four Scandinavian countries which now have
institutional mechanisms in place to investigate allegations
of misconduct [9].) To compensate for this hands-off attitude,
many (but not all) editors and publishers now accept their
responsibility to report findings of misconduct that affect articles
that have already appeared in their pages, and publish retraction
or correction notices if they are informed that the data have not
withstood scrutiny [1, 2, 4]. Anti-misconduct measures
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implemented by journals are thus sometimes effective in
drawing the readers’ attention to the fact that the horse has
escaped, but may have little effect on ensuring that the barn
door is locked in the first place. 
As a result of the US government’s investigations into
notorious incidents of alleged scientific misconduct that came
to official attention during the 1980s and early 1990s,
institutions requesting NIH funds for research were obliged to
develop formal ethical and professional guidelines specifying
the levels of responsibility for investigating dubious research
and publication practices, and abuse of power within the
academic hierarchy. This has probably been the most important
consequence of the scandal for publicly-funded science.
Academic centers have been urged to commit themselves to
developing their own rapid, fair, and transparent procedures
for deciding whether abuse has taken place. In most cases, this
change in policy has not occurred spontaneously, but has been
a reaction to the perceived threat of government interference
with the conduct of science. However, issues of authorship,
legitimate scientific disagreement or error, good laboratory
practices, and ethical publication practices continue to create
problems. The economic and professional circumstances that
lead researchers to resort to ethically questionable tactics in
order to publish often and ahead of their competitors, and to
receive continued funding for their work, have not changed.
Although universities now appear more willing to punish
delinquent staff who have been caught after the fact (often
simply by terminating their research, while allowing them to
keep their teaching post), evidence is still needed that
institutional procedures for investigating their own employees
are actually effective in preventing or changing unethical
behavior before it occurs. 
Countries and transnational organizations that often look
to the US or UK governments for models on how to administer
research funds, reward productive scientists and handle
misconduct investigations should consider their own cultural
and historical differences in research practices before they
attempt to import solutions that have not yet been proved
effective, without due regard for cultural and historical
differences in research practices. It may be better in the long
term to educate researchers about professional ethics [8],
although it will always be necessary to have a well-designed
system in place to define, detect and sanction abuses.
Researchers, like other professional collectives, must now accept
that accountability needs to form a key element of their work
ethic.
References 
1. Abbott A, Dalton, R, Saegusa A (1999) Science comes to terms with the
lessons of fraud. Nature 398:13–17
2. Cooper-Mahkorn D (1998) Many journals have not retracted “fraudulent”
research. Br Med J 316:1850
3. Horton R (1999) Scientific misconduct: exaggerated fear but still real
and requiring a proportionate response. The Lancet 354:7–8
4. International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (1997) Uniform
requirements for manuscripts submitted to biomedical journals. Ann Int
Med 126:36–47
5. Kaiser J, Marshall E (1996) Imanishi-Kari ruling slams ORI. Science
272:1864–1865
6. Kevles DJ (1998) Star chamber will result in injustice. Correspondence.
Nature 395:317
7. Lock S (1999) Reviews. The Baltimore Case. A Trial of Politics, Science,
and Character. Br Med J 319:926
8. Melguid MM (1999) Editors’ responsibility in defeating fraud.
Correspondence. Nature 399:13
9. Nylenna M, Andersen D, Dahlquist G, Sarvas M, Aakvaag, on behalf of
the National Committees on Scientific Dishonesty in the Nordic Countries
(1999) Handling of scientific dishonesty in the Nordic countries. The
Lancet 354:57–61
10. Steele FR (1999) The Baltimore Case. Book Review. Nature Medicine
5:13–14
11. Turvey J (1998) Trials and errors. Book review. Nature 395:30–31
12. Weaver D, Reis MH, Albanese C, Constantini F, Baltimore D, Imanishi-
Kari T (1986) Altered repertoire of endogenous immunoglobulin gene
expression in transgenic mice containing a rearranged mu heavy chain
gene. Cell 45:247–259
Interesting websites 
www.nyx.net/~wstewart Walter Stewart’s site on research fraud and misconduct 
http://ori.dhhs.gov Department of Health and Human Services site. Contains
the text of the reformed procedures for investigating allegations of research
misconduct
www.acponline.org/journals/resource/unifreq American College of
Physicians site (publishers of the Uniform Requirements). Contains updates
of the original document in the form of Additional Statements, which provide
professional and ethical guidance on publication issues
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